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Visions of Europe. 
Emerging challenges for the European project in the aftermath of 




The 2008 economic crisis redefined the political relationship between European 
citizens and the European Union, between the member states and EU institutions, and 
between countries within the European Union, unveiling economic, social and 
cultural differences across member states and within their domestic polities that had 
previously remained largely concealed. The crisis led to the re-emergence of critical 
nodes of the European project, questioning the very principles adhered to by member 
states and European citizens.  
Like other scholars (Bolgherini 2016; Fabbrini 2015), we interpret the period 
that followed the economic crisis as a critical juncture in the process of European 
integration ± the third, according to Fabbrini, after the two that followed the end of 
the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. European integration has been 
considered as ³perpetually in FULVLV´ (Baglioni and Hurrelmann 2016, 104) and, 
indeed, a permanent status of crisis and the management thereof are a constitutional 
feature of democratic regimes (Urbinati 2013). However, the current phase stands out 
as something different from the ordinary strains and pressures that are part and parcel 
of democratic life. Rather than being the manifestation of the typical tensions and 
dynamics, the processes of European integration and EU decision-making have 
evidenced the need for major reform of the EuURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO
architecture and modus operandi, and presented national and European leaders with 
choices that will have a lasting impact (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Pierson 2004) 
RQWKH8QLRQ¶V nature and identity.  
A commonly held (but not consensus1) view is that what started as an 
exogenous financial crisis evolved into an economic and then sovereign debt crisis in 
the weakest EU member states. This, in turn, ended up engulfing the monetary union 
(Majone 2014b), leading to a profound political crisis for the EU as a whole: a crisis 
of leadership, legitimacy and, ultimately, purpose. Whilst much has already been said 
                                                        
1 $FFRUGLQJWRDJURXSRIOHDGLQJ(XURSHDQHFRQRPLVWV WKH(XURFULVLVµVKRXOGQRW
be thought of as a government crisis in its origin ± HYHQWKRXJKLWHYROYHGLQWRRQH¶
See http://www.voxeu.org/article/ez-crisis-consensus-narrative.  
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on the individual µGLPHQVLRQVRIFULVLV¶ outlined above, far less is known on how they 
interweave and on their long-term effects, notably their impact on the E8¶V
institutional architecture, on the politicisation of the European public sphere, on the 
wider dynamics of representation that underpin these processes, and on the political 
systems and polities of the member states. With this special issue, and in this 
introduction, we aim to contribute to the understanding of these themes. We do so by 
offering, first, an interpretative overview of the key dimensions of crisis that are 
currently challenging the EU. Drawing on such premises, we move on to appraise the 
2014 European Parliament election ± understood as a turning point for the EU ± with 
reference to the findings of the six articles in this collection. We then conclude with 
some reflections on what the trends discussed in the special issue tell us about the 
future µYLVLRQVRI(XURSH¶ and the associated implications for research designs. 
 
A crisis of leadership  
The ways in which the initial economic crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis 
were tackled by the EU demonstrated an inability of EU leaders to act swiftly, 
cohesively and for the long term. Whilst there has been a European response ± or 
rather a succession of European responses ± they have been partial.2 They were 
achieved ³slowly and reluctantly´ (Hall 2014, 1231) and weighted disproportionately 
on Southern member states, on whom adjustment costs were largely concentrated 
(see Hall 2014). Most of all, as recently argued by a group of prominent European 
economists under the Vox-EU platform, the response measures did not focus on the 
underlying roots of the crisis, without a consensus on which the necessary long-term 
solution is unlikely to emerge.3  
Agreement on the causes and, as a result, on the solutions to the Eurozone 
crisis has proved impossible, in part, because of the different mindsets of EU leaders, 
embedded in distinct national economic doctrines and political economy histories 
(Hall 2014) and, in part, because of the divergent national interests and unpalatability 
                                                        
2 They have resulted in a composite and incremental mix of bailout packages, 
dedicated European funds (the European Financial Stability Fund and, subsequently, 
the European Stability Mechanism), enhanced monitoring of national economic 
policies (the European semester), and coordination of national fiscal policies (the 
Fiscal Compact) (Begg 2015b; Crum and Curtin 2015). 
3 Avent R. The euro crisis was not a government-debt crisis, The Economist, 23 
November 2015 (online edition). See also http://www.voxeu.org/article/ez-crisis-
consensus-narrative.  
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of redistributive choices for the short-term µlosers¶, namely the wealthier Northern 
European (creditor) member states.  
Despite the number of measures progressively introduced to strengthen the 
architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the further reforms 
announced by the Commission in a recent Communication (European Commission 
2015), the road ahead looks tortuous and uncertain. The Communication was 
intended to implement the so-called Five Presidents Report, published in June 2015 
by the Presidents of the European Commission, the European Council, Eurogroup, 
the European Central Bank and the European Parliament (Juncker 2015).4 However, 
both the Five Presidents Report and the ensuing Communication ³watered down´ a 
number of provisions that had already been foreseen in the previous Four Presidents 
Report5 issued in 2012 (Begg 2015a), demonstrating an awareness of the challenges 
in implementation. Despite this toning down ± which led to criticism about the 
incisiveness of the package ± many of the provisions proposed are still ³likely to 
encounter resistance from a number of EU countries´ (Begg 2015a). The prospect of 
an Economic and Monetary Union strengthened (eventually) through a fully-fledged 
political and fiscal union remains implausible.  
Even leaving aside the Eurozone crisis, the predominance of domestic 
interests at the expense of unified visions of Europe has been underlined by the way 
in which the EU has handled other recent crises. These include the refugee 
emergency, the instability in the Middle East and Northern Africa (from which the 
former descends), the crisis in the Eastern border following from Russia's illegal 
annexation of parts of Ukraine, and the security threat posed by Islamic terrorism. 
For example, the refugee emergency, which according to Amnesty International 
(2015) is the most serious refugee crisis faced by Europe since the Second World 
War, has been met with only disjointed, ad hoc responses, largely informed by 
national interests. EU solutions ranged from a continued reliance on the 
Mediterranean programmes (in principle, intended as economic development 
programmes) and on EU-Turkey cooperation, to reallocations of financial resources 
from existing budgetary headings, such as unspent amounts under European 
Cohesion policy (Crisp 2016). However, a key concern for many national political 
leaders, especially in the Northern and Eastern member states, has been to make sure 
                                                        
4  
5 In 2012, the President of the European Parliament was not included. 
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that the number of refugees flowing to their countries would remain within 
domestically acceptable figures. 
 The way the EU responded to the Ukraine-Russia conflict presents another 
telling example of the difficulty in providing EU-wide responses. The second 
anniversary of the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia was marked by a 
declaration published on politico.eu by the Foreign Ministers of the Baltic and Nordic 
States, restating the QHHG WR µUHPDLQ YLJLODQW¶ and constantly monitor the non-
recognition policy and EU sanctions already in place (Wallström et al. 2016). More 
incisive, EU-wide political action was clearly seen as out of question.  
 
A crisis of legitimacy  
A second issue, which is closely connected with the leadership crisis outlined above, 
concerns legitimacy. The responses given to the economic and Euro crises 
highlighted a growing contradiction between, on the one hand, the µHPHUJHQF\¶, 
largely technocratic, EU-level decision-making (White 2015; Statham and Trenz 
2015), and, on the other hand, the increased salience of the EU in the public debates 
within the member states. The crisis, and the associated EU response, contributed to 
the Europeanisation of public discourses in the EU member states, and in so doing 
they increased the saliency of the EU in domestic political debates, bringing renewed 
centrality to EU institutions and policies (Leupold 2016). This has improved the 
DELOLW\ RI (XURSHDQ FLWL]HQV WR DSSRUWLRQ µEODPH¶ IRU (8-level decisions to the EU 
rather than to national parliaments. However, it has not translated into an improved 
ability of EU citizens to precisely identify those actors (European-level parties and 
politicians as decision-makers) that should be punished (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). Put 
simply, European citizens are unable to throw the (European) rascals out, insofar as it 
is difficult for them ³to identify which parties are responsible for the current policy 
outcomes and which parties offer an alternative´ (Hobolt 2014, 1531).  
 Partly to address this problem, the 2014 European Parliament elections were 
held under altered rules. The European Parliament, through an own resolution,6 
managed to introduce an important change to the appointment procedure of the 
President of the European Commission. It did so by inviting EU Parties to appoint 
lead candidates, or Spitzencandidaten, who would (in the view of the European 
                                                        
6 Resolution 22 November 2012, see Hobolt 2014.
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3DUOLDPHQW¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH SURYLVLRns of the Lisbon Treaty) be appointed 
Commission President in the event of electoral victory (Hobolt 2014; Schmitt, 
Hobolt, and Popa 2015). Thus, for the first time, voters had the opportunity to clearly 
identify the nominees running for the head of the European executive. The aim of this 
was twofold: to exploit the mobilisation effect of personalisation (Musella and Webb 
2015; Calise 2015) in order to create a stronger connection with citizens, and to 
bridge the EU accountability gap (Gattermann, de Vreese, and van der Brug 2016).  
However, evidence available to date suggests that the impact of this change 
on voting behaviour has been limited, albeit diversified across member states (Hobolt 
2015). ³[T]urnout remained low at 42.6 per cent, government parties were the losers 
and smaller parties the winners, and the introduction of lead candidates seemed to 
have gone unnoticed by most citizens´ (Hobolt 2015, 6; see also Hobolt 2014 and 
Schmitt, Hobolt and Popa2015). The introduction of Spitzencandidaten has had an 
effect on informed citizens, but it did not succeed in mobilising the less interested or 
disenfranchised EU voters (Gattermann, de Vreese, and van der Brug 2016). As in 
previous European Parliament elections, rather than sanctioning EU political parties 
for their actions, voters¶concerns about the handling of the crisis and dissatisfaction 
with the austerity policies were channelled through a vote for Eurosceptic or outright 
anti-EU parties.7 In other words, what was being punished was the EU, not its 
political decision-makers, just as in 2009 (Hobolt and Tilley 2014).8  
The complex and piecemeal procedures through which the EU measures to 
tackle the Eurozone crisis were designed and subsequently put in place further 
contributed to the difficulty for European citizens¶ to identify in clear terms the 
political actors ultimately responsible for decisions (Crum and Curtin 2015). The 
subdivision of competences and the balance of powers between different European 
institutions are obscure for the public, rendering EU decision-making a black box in 
the eyes of the layperson. For example, the Commission displays a considerable 
degree of discretion in the exercise of its functions under the European semester, yet 
its activities remain largely hidden from public scrutiny (Crum and Curtin 2015). 
                                                        
7 Predominantly left-wing parties in the debtor, Southern member states, and radical 
right-wing parties in Northern Europe, see Hobolt 2015. 
8 It has been recognised, however, that even though the change did not have a direct 
effect on turnout, it did contribute to increased media attention over the European 
Parliament elections, attributing more salience to the EU in domestic public debates 
(Schulze 2016), thus reinforcing elements of accountability. 
 6 
The role of the European Parliament in the dialogue with the Councils and the 
Commission remains secondary. Similarly secondary is the role of national 
Parliaments in sanctioning the collective decisions taken by their governments in the 
Council or in informing national budgets and the implementation of country-specific 
recommendations (Crum and Curtin 2015). The procedures put in place to prevent 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances mean that national budgets are now submitted 
to Brussels before going to the national Parliaments (Majone 2014a).  
In sum, the way the EU has responded to the economic and Eurozone crises 
manifests a number of accountability and, as a result, legitimacy deficits, and ³it is 
not only the citizens that are being excluded from the debate about the future of the 
(XUR]RQH´ 0DMRQH D 1221), but also national governments and parliaments. 
Many national governments had to agree to severe austerity measures and structural 
reform programmes (concerning the welfare state and labour market) not as a result 
of domestic political choices but as the outcome of negotiations with external actors: 
the µ7URLND¶, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other PHPEHU VWDWHV¶ 
governments. The fact that a number of national governments, constrained by the 
pressures of international financial markets, had to redefine their policy agendas 
according to such external demands has been viewed as an interference which has 
undermined ³democratic self-determination´ and impacted on ³citizens sense of self-
efficacy´, increasing their ³dissatisfaction with democracy´ (Armingeon and 
Guthmann 2014, 424). In Greece, for example, in July 2015, when the bailout deal 
was being finalised about one week after the Greek referendum had rejected further 
austerity, ³the hashtag #thisisacoup trended on twitter´ (Buttonwood 2015).  
Scholarly debates have long focussed on whether the EU is characterised by a 
democratic deficit (Føllesdal and Hix 2006). This debate has grown in parallel with 
the expansion of the (8¶V supranational competences via successive treaty reforms. 
In this debate, legitimation has been characterised mainly by democratic input or 
substantive output (Hobolt 2015; Majone 2014a); at the present juncture, the EU 
appears to be failing on both fronts. As a result, in continuation with a trend whose 
first signs HPHUJHGLQWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWHOHFWLRQVµ(XURSH¶KDVVKLIWHG
from traditional marginality to a new, mainly negative, centrality boosted by µparty 
contestation¶ (Shuck et al. 2011) ± a contestation that has spilled over into domestic 
arenas. Eurosceptic parties, in particular, have reinforced their presence not only in 
the European Parliament, but also in national and sub-national assemblies (most 
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recently in Germany, in the regional elections held in March 2016). At the same time, 
Eurosceptic rhetoric is becoming increasingly evident, even within mainstream 
political parties. This signals a growing and bipartisan loss of trust in the European 
project at the grassroots level, as well as a widening of the fracture between political 
élites (national and European) and EU technocracies, on the one hand, and the lay 
European citizen on the other hand. But it also alters the internal political and party 
dynamics of the EU member states in a manner that, in our view, is not yet fully 
appreciated and begs further investigation.  
 
A crisis of purpose  
The leadership crisis within the EU outlined above goes hand in hand with a loss of 
shared purpose. The Euro, for example, which was originally conceived as a tool to 
foster an ever-closer political union, has become a goal in itself in the most recent 
narratives of European leaders (Majone 2014b). On one level, this may not be 
surprising if, despite ³the bold political vision set out in the founding treaty´ of an 
ever-closer political union, monetary and market integration have been the actual 
core of ³the reality of European integration´ (Hobolt and de Vries 2016, 22.8). 
However, this shift in focus can be interpreted as a resignation from even the 
intention to pursue the WUHDW\¶Vambitious political goals. Taken to extremes, it can be 
read as a sign that EU leaders are abdicating their very role.  
More recently, the Brexit negotiations can be seen as a further example of a 
lack of common vision by EU leadership on what the EU should be about. Primarily 
engaged in finding workable solutions to accommodate UK requests, so as to avert 
the loss of an important member and the political and economic consequences that 
this would entail, EU leaders failed to engage in a thorough reflection about the 
systemic reforms that would be necessary in an increasingly contested ± but also 
ever-expanding9 ± Union (Zuleeg 2016), and on what this would mean for the future 
configuration of the Union under both scenarios (Brexit or Brexin).  
At the same time, some of the founding values and principles upon which the 
European project was built, foreseen by the treaty, such as the free movement of 
                                                        
9 Whilst negotiations with Turkey are effectively suspended, the accession 
negotiations are progressing with regard to Albania, the Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia, with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo as potential 
candidates.  
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people and the attainment of prosperity for all across the continent, are, if not overtly 
questioned, at least being set aside. For instance, the terrorist attacks in France in 
January and November 2015 have accelerated the transformation of a set of 
controversial proposals linked to border management into actual policies, despite 
opposition concerning data protection (Bossong and Carrapico 2016), and to 
suspensions of the provision of the Schengen Agreement. Thus, emergency-driven 
responses have prevailed over democratically established priorities. All of this shows 
hRZ ³(XURSH is again at a crossroad, not only economically but even more so 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOO\ DQG SROLWLFDOO\ -RVFKND )LVKHU¶V TXHVWLRQ LQ  µQuo Vadis 
Europa?¶ has not yet received a proper answer´ (Meny 2014, 1336). 
In many respects, it could be argued that rather than having stopped at a 
crossroad, European integration is taking steps backwards in the institutionalisation 
process that transformed the economic community into a political union in the 
making. Such retrenchment is showing the fragility of progress realised through an 
LQWHJUDWLRQ µE\ VWHDOWK¶: a process that benefitted from a long, but not perpetual, 
favourable economic context, and that appears ill-suited to a much-enlarged EU, 
where growing diversity is making the costs of EU integration increasingly visible 
(Majone 2014a). In truth, the process of integration is becoming increasingly 
differentiated too (Tekin 2012), but this is actually exacerbating the territorial 
cleavages between member states. For example, the divides between creditor and 
debtor countries, and between members and non-members of the Eurozone, are 
becoming starker (Majone 2014a). And this is happening at a time when the internal 
divides within the member states are also deepening, as shown by the momentum 
gained by independentist parties. The presence of secessionist and independentist 
parties is spreading across many EU member states (Elias and Tronconi 2011; 
Hepburn and Elias 2011; Hepburn 2009), signalling the emergence of internal 
fractures that further problematise the process of integration (Laible 2008). Against 
such a complex backdrop, the future political direction of the EU appears 
increasingly uncertain, DQG WKH ULVN WKDW WKH (8 ZLOO WXUQ LQWR D µFOXE RI FOXEV¶
(Majone 2014a; Majone 2014b) seems tangible. 
 
Visions of Europe: key issues and the challenges ahead 
The analysis developed in the previous sections illustrates how, in the current 
context, the EU project is facing multiple institutional, political and democratic 
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challenges. As noted above, the lack of a cohesive and effective EU political 
leadership, the declining trust in the EU and the on-going alteration of political and 
party dynamics within the member states are placing Europe and its institutions under 
considerable strain. The aim of this collection of articles emerges from the need to 
shed light on the roots, manifestations and implications of such pressures. To achieve 
this, we take the 2014 European Parliament elections as a starting point for analysis. 
Such an approach rests on the view that the 2014 European Parliament electoral 
round epitomises, in a most profound way, the idiosyncrasies implicit in the EU 
project. Taking place at a time when the effects of the economic crisis and the 
consequent dissatisfaction with austerity measures were still sharply felt by EU 
citizens, the 2014 elections were an important test for the European Union and for the 
institution of democracy within and across EU member states. In many respects, 
DOWKRXJK (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW HOHFWLRQV DUH RIWHQ GHVFULEHG DV µVHFRQG RUGHU¶ WKLV
time around the vote for the European Parliament seemed to challenge such a view. 
In spite of, or perhaps due to, the multiple crises described above, which are 
undermining the very foundations of the European Union as a political project, the 
EU is playing an increasingly central role in the public debate and has been thrust 
centre stage. Albeit framed mainly in a negative sense (i.e. with more reference to 
flaws than to virtues), the 2014 European Parliament elections coincided with an 
increased politicisation of the EU and with a profound alteration of the dynamics of 
representation underpinning the European sphere, which in turn affected domestic 
political and party systems. The articles in this collection provide fresh insights on 
these issues, as is discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
The politicisation of the EU and the Europeanisation of public debates 
The paradigm of second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980), which has until 
recently acted as an effective interpretive key to understand voting behaviour in 
European elections, should perhaps be reassessed when considering the 2014 
European Parliament elections. In many respects, the European Union is no longer 
just a supranational political player, detached from the daily life of citizens. On the 
contrary, as noted by Schmitt and Teperoglou (2015), even if electoral choices in the 
2014 European Parliament elections reflect the logic of the second-order election 
paradigm, there are also indicators of change. The 2014 elections became a critical 
 10 
contest, in which ³the EU divide has become more significant, polarised and 
important in determining voting choices´ (Schmitt and Teperoglou 2015, 304).  
Several scholars have argued that the EU is undergoing a rapid process of 
politicisation which, in turn, is redefining its role. De Wilde et al. (2015, 4) claim that 
such increased politicisation of the EU could be empirically identified through three 
main dimensions: ³(a) the growing salience of European governance, involving (b) a 
polarisation of opinion, and (c) an expansion of actors and audiences engaged in 
monitoring EU affairV´ Such traits of politicisation can be readily found within the 
public debates of EU member states (ibidem). Similar traits of politicisation are noted 
by Hoeglinger (2016): (a) the polarisation of attitudes, (b) the intensification of the 
public debate (saliency), and (c) the connection of the contested issues to pre-existing 
basic political concerns. Crucially, both conceptualisations of the politicisation of the 
EU converge in underlining the key role of the public sphere.  
The politicisation of the EU and the Europeanisation of the public debate is 
discussed in Marinella Belluati¶VDUWLFOH. Taking into account five newspapers from 
five EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK), Belluati analyses the 
dynamics of media coverage during the European Parliament election campaigns. 
The results of this work suggest that the focus on the EU was mainly domestically 
oriented, that is, centred on national political actors and issues. Nonetheless, the 
research also reveals that the focus of public debate was on the EU, mostly driven by 
Eurosceptic stances, parties and leaders. The EU, in other words, was certainly more 
central in domestic public debates, but it was generally framed in a negative sense. 
 
 
Dynamics of representation 
Dynamics of political representation are rapidly changing within and across the EU, 
putting the increasingly problematic nature of the relationship between EU citizens 
and institutions under the spotlight. The structural weaknesses that inhibit the ability 
of EU institutions to respond to external challenges, such as the economic and 
humanitarian crises, have already been discussed in the preceding sections. The key 
point here is that such processes have considerably undermined the legitimacy of the 
EU. Hence, it is important to investigate further the motifs and effects that underpin 
the changing relationship between the EU, its member states and its citizens. This 
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collection offers three contributions that investigate such questions, adopting 
different analytical perspectives.   
Firstly, the economic crisis has become the casus belli around which the 
relationship between member states and EU institutions, on the one hand, and 
between citizens and the EU, on the other, has been redefined. Stefano Rombi¶V
article adopts the traditional perspective of economic voting to investigate the nature 
of the electoral behaviour in European competitions. By taking into account four 
European Parliament elections in all EU member states, his work analyses the effect 
of macroeconomic indicators (unemployment) on voting behaviour. The results 
confirm the applicability of the paradigm of economic voting to EU elections. This is 
interesting, especially in the light of the increased politicisation of the EU noted 
above. As Bellucci, Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) have argued, economic 
globalisation and the involvement in decision-making of a wide range of (political 
and economic) supranational and international actors have eroded traditional 
governmental powers in the steering of the economy, consequently decreasing the 
accountability of domestic governments vis-à-vis their electors. In line with this, 
5RPEL¶VZRUNILQGVWKDWWKHYRWHUV± following media and political parties¶ rhetoric ± 
perceive the EU as the culprit of economic decline and are less likely to blame their 
national governments for the consequences of the economic crisis (see also -Lobo 
and Lewis-Beck 2012). Overall5RPEL¶VVWXG\Vhows that the economic crisis does 
impact on voters¶ choices. Within this frame, unemployment emerges as the most 
significant macroeconomic variable. Crucially, this affects the electoral behaviour not 
only of those directly affected by unemployment, but also of the voters who perceive 
the economic environment within the EU as being unfavourable more generally.  
Secondly, Gabriela Borz focuses on political representation in connection 
with European integration. Her analysis aims at clarifying the link between citizens 
and political parties¶ opinions on European integration. Following cost-benefit logic, 
the results of her study show that perceived benefits facilitate a voter-party match, 
while perceived costs ± especially if high ± drive the match between Eurosceptic 
voters and like-minded parties. The most interesting result FRQFHUQV µLQGLIIHUHQW
YRWHUV¶QDPHO\WKRVHwho prefer the status quo, and who seem to be able to vote for 
both pro- and anti-integration parties. This category of voters can be more commonly 
found in µold member states¶DQGit includes citizens who are less satisfied with the 
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way in which the EU works in practice but who, more generally, have a positive view 
of the European Union. These outcomes, based on 2009 ESS (European Social 
Survey) data, provide an interesting interpretative frame for the 2014 European 
Parliament elections, in that they show how indifferent voters can shift towards 
Eurosceptic parties as a result of the perceived costs of integration.  
Thirdly, Fabio Sozzi looks at the dynamics of political representation, 
FRQVLGHULQJ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ HOHFWRUDO UXOHV DQG 0(3V µFRQVWLWXHQF\
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶, measured through the lens of parliamentary questions. To achieve 
this, the author examines the behaviour of Italian and French MEPs, who are 
representative of different systems in terms of ballot structure and district magnitude. 
6R]]L¶V analysis explores a large dataset of 5,343 written parliamentary questions 
asked by Italian and French MEPs during the sixth term of the European Parliament 
(2004-2009). The results confirm the hypothesis WKDW0(3V¶EHKDYLRXULVDIIHFWHGE\
electoral rules. If the electoral system provides a stronger connection between 
candidates and their supporters, MEPs will have more incentives to be constituency-
oriented in their positions. The analysis illustrates how French MEPs, who are elected 
through closed ballots, have a feebler link with their constituency, which is mirrored 
in their behaviour in Parliament. On the other hand, Italian MEPs have more 
incentives to cultivate their personal reputation; hence they pay more attention to 
constituency demands. This, in turn, has profound implications for the way in which 
citizens perceive political representation at EU level in the two countries. Sozzi 
shows that electoral rules do have direct consequences on representation, which 
suggests that there is a need for more research on MEP behaviour and electoral rules 
in relation to other countries. 
 
The impact on domestic political and party systems  
As already highlighted, we contend that the economic and Eurozone crises, and the 
EU response to them, are having important effects on the domestic political systems 
of EU member states. First, the economic crisis significantly affected the territorial 
and sectoral composition of public expenditure, with negative consequences for 
countrLHV¶ long-term growth prospects (Grisorio and Prota 2015; Bubbico and 
Catalina-Rubianes 2015). This impact has been particularly severe for the more 
vulnerable people and territories, as is testified by the exacerbation of social 
inequalities and regional disparities across the EU (European Commission 2014). It is 
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reasonable to expect that these socially and territorially differentiated effects of the 
crisis would impact on voting behaviour.  
Second, and related, the austerity packages and structural reforms have led to 
a re-centralisation of a substantial amount of policy competences in a number of 
countries (Bolgherini 2016; Muro 2015; Council of European Municipalities and 
Regions 2013). A question here is the degree to which this will translate into new 
political centre-periphery cleavages. The 2015 regional elections in Italy, for 
example, highlighted a rise in local lists and a decline in mainstream political parties 
(Vampa 2015).  
Third, as has been noted, the rise of Euroscepticism was a feature of the 2014 
elections, also in countries that had long been amongst the most convinced EU 
supporters. Particularly interesting insights on this can be drawn from the analysis of 
the 2014 European Parliament election results in Italy where, for the first time, 
Eurosceptic parties gained more than 50 per cent of the votes (circa 20 per cent more 
than in 2009)10 (Huysseune 2010; Conti 2014), demonstrating a shift of public 
opinion from Europhile to Eurosceptic positions. This shows a sharp decline in 
FLWL]HQV¶ WUXVW LQ WKH(8DQG LWV LQVWLWXWLRQV<HW VRPHZKDWSDUDGR[LFDOO\ WKH WUXVW
that Italian citizens place in the European Union continues to remain significantly 
higher than that enjoyed by the Italian parties, Parliament, trade unions, State and 
regional authorities.11 This raises questions about the true nature of the Italian anti-
EU turn and whether it could be linked to a more generalised populist reaction. 
These themes are tackled by two of the contributions in this volume. To start 
with, Riera and Russo examine the generational and territorial cleavages through a 
comparative analysis of Italy and Spain. They appraise the electoral performance of 
two new parties ± the Five Star Movement, in Italy, and Podemos, in Spain ± in the 
2014 European Parliament elections, analysing data at municipal, rather than 
                                                        
10 In the 2009 EU Elections, all together, Eurosceptic parties gained 16.7% of votes. 
In detail: the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN), 10.2%, Communist Refoundation 
(Rifondazione Comunista, RC) 3.4%, Left Ecology and Freedom (Sinistra ecologia e 
Libertà, SEL) 3.1%. In 2014, the Eurosceptic votes rose to 51.8%, thanks in part to 
the performance of the Five Star Movement: (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) 21.2%, Go 
Italy (Forza Italia, FI) 16.8%, Northern League 6.2%, Tsipras List 4% and Italian 
%URWKHUV)UDWHOOLG¶,WDOLD)', 
11 Demos and Pi survey, December 2015: http://www.demos.it/rapporto.php. Only 5 
per cent of those surveyed declared to have considerable trust in Italian parties, 10 per 
cent in the Italian Parliament and 22 per cent in the Italian State, against 30 per cent 
who declared to have considerable trust in the European Union. 
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constituency, level. They argue that focussing on the municipal level allows for a 
more accurate analysis of local characteristics and aspects of voting behaviour 
(especially in connection with the economic crisis) that could not be detected at 
constituency level. The study shows: the presence of unsatisfied political demands 
KLJKDEVWHQWLRQUDWHVDQGYRWHUV¶YRODWLOLW\ in both countries; considerable territorial 
variation, in both countries, in the electoral performance of the two new parties 
across municipalities; and that the economic crisis had a marked (positive) impact on 
the electoral affirmation of the two parties, which, however, is differentiated across 
the two countries.  
Caiani and Graziano look at the rise of populism in the context of European 
Parliament elections. Going beyond the debate on theoretical definitions of populism, 
they find that focussing on empirical cases allows an appreciation that populism can 
manifest itself in multiple ways. The authors argue that, in order to be fully 
understood, populism should be considered not as a ³syndrome to be cured´but as an 
observable phenomenon which may concern all political parties present in a given 
domestic political community. To substantiate this claim, the authors concentrate on 
the case of Italy, and they appraise the interaction between Italian political parties and 
populism traits in a diachronic analysis based on a four-dimensional classification of 
populism (populism index) in the context of three European Parliament elections in 
2004, 2009 and 2014. Through a systematic examination of Euromanifestos and party 
statutes, their analysis demonstrates that the crisis triggered a consolidation of 
populist traits across the Italian party system, leading to: the emergence of a new 
populist party (the Five Star Movement); the strengthening of the electoral 
performance of the Northern League (presently the most populist Italian party, 
according to the scholars¶ index); and the enhancement of populist features in other 
pre-existing political parties, with the notable exception of the Italian Democratic 
Party (contradicting the findings of Biorcio 2015). Further, Caiani and Graziano 
suggest that the financial crisis acted as an µH[RJHQRXV VKRFN¶ that facilitated the 
emergence and consolidation of populist traits. The denunciation of the crisis and 
accusations against the EU and its institutions for failing to provide a suitable 
response feature strongly in Euromanifestos. Thus, the study confirms the link 
between populism and Euroscepticism and political protest proposed by Canovan 
(1999). Despite focussing on the Italian case, Caiani and Graziano¶s work is also 
UHPDUNDEOHLQWKDWLWGRHVQRWVLPSO\RIIHUDµVQDSVKRW¶RISRSXOLVPLQ,WDO\but also 
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offers a method to appraise the degree of populism present in any given political 
system, adding to the study of such phenomena in other countries. 
 
Conclusions 
Through an examination of the 2014 (and, in some cases, preceding) European 
Parliament elections, the articles in this special issue provide new evidence on the 
linkage between the economic crisis and a number of EU-level political and 
institutional developments, including EU politicisation and Europeanisation of 
domestic frames. Whilst the crisis contributed to increasing the salience of the EU, at 
the same time it also delegitimised it. Responses to the economic crisis were 
perceived as not only technocratic but also as externally-imposed, bringing to the 
surface a long-simmering discontent amongst EU citizens that has found an outlet in 
Euroscepticism and anti-EU voting. The studies presented in this special issue also 
offer a novel interpretative frame for the 2014 elections. European Parliament 
elections have traditionally been viewed as second-order elections. This time, 
however, it was different, citizens did vote with EU issues in mind. 
Importantly, the articles in this collection also shed light on the impact that 
European-level developments are having on the domestic political systems of EU 
member states, such as the emergence of new parties, the electoral strengthening of 
Eurosceptic parties, and a discernible increase in populist features across the entire 
political spectrum (i.e. also in non-populist parties). What is remarkable about the 
combination of populism and Euroscepticism that emerged as a key feature of the 
2014 elections is that it is not simply retrospectively linked to the austerity measures 
that followed the economic crisis (whose effects are emphasised by several articles in 
this collection), but that it is also projected towards the future, questioning the role 
and sovereignty of the EU, and hinting at the need for the creation of new, and often 
ad hoc, relationships between the EU and its member states.  
Whereas the dynamics of electoral behaviour favoured Eurosceptic and 
populist parties, they also triggered an µemulation effect¶ among traditionally 
Europhile parties that are increasingly adopting critical narratives towards the EU. 
Thus, despite the growing saliency of Europe in domestic public debates, the EU 
appears more and more as a jigsaw of diverging domestic interests and agendas. This 
is not to say that domestic interests never mattered before. Of course, they have 
always been part and parcel of the construct of Europe, and the EU has played a role 
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in safeguarding them. However, in the current context, domestic interests are 
becoming increasingly polarised and conflicting. This is leading to the emergence of 
a number of competing visions of Europe, which challenge in a most profound way 
the idea of the EU as a coherent construct, generating constraints ± rather than 
opportunities ± for the integration process. Our overall conclusion is that EU-level 
and domestic-level developments both reflect and influence each other. Neither can 
be understood in isolation from the other. In our view, this calls for research designs 
that bridge different political science subfields, and for more vigorous cross-
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